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Postmodernism “changed tense” from present to past, Raymond Federman once wrote, 
on the same date that Samuel Beckett did — December 22, 1989, the day of Beckett’s 
death.
1
  That year, while proposed in a spirit of serious play, nevertheless has multiple 
resonances, often construed in geopolitical terms. The breaching of the Berlin Wall one 
month before Beckett died marked the symbolic, if not actual, end of the Cold War. As 
Christian Moraru writing in this volume puts it, the fall of the Wall became “shorthand” 
for a “world-event,” one which set “in train a radical, epoch-making Wende (‘change’ or 
‘turn’).” The dissolution of the Soviet Union and its empire; the bloody suppression of 
the democracy movement at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square; the release of Nelson Mandela 
and the beginning of the end of apartheid — collectively such events certainly seemed to 
herald the end of one thing and the onset of something else.  The U.S. administration of 
George Bush the elder thought 1989 marked the beginning of a New World Order in 
which America, as the sole remaining superpower, would inevitably take the global lead, 
as it did in the First Gulf War (or “Operation Desert Storm”) in 1991.  The political 
scientist Francis Fukuyama put himself notionally on side when he dramatically 
associated 1989 with the Hegelian (or Kojèvian) “end of history.”2 
But American triumphalism, like Fukuyama’s place in the media spotlight, did 
not last long. Political liberalization in places like Taiwan, Chile, South Africa, and 
Indonesia, and market reform in such countries as China and Vietnam carried with it 
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“difficult” and often “unexpected” outcomes. The millenarianist culmination of “reform” 
also shared uncomfortable synchronicity with terrible geopolitical crises and genocides 
— the Yugoslav civil war of 1991-95, the first intifada in Palestine and the Rwandan civil 
war — which the New World Order seemed quite incapable of “managing.” A serious 
economic slump, in Japan and South East Asia, for example, in the later 90s, also rained 
on the parade, undermining emerging “neoliberalism” in pretty well all respects. Indeed, 
from the perspective of 2015, the abrupt disappearance of the polarized world of the Cold 
War in 1989-91 now appears to be less of a decisive break and  more of a hiatus — a 
political interregnum broken by the equally abrupt emergence of the newly polarized (or 
re-polarized) world of the post 9/11 War on Terror.  
From such perspectives it becomes clear that history did not end in 1989 as 
Fukuyama imagined it would and neither did postmodernism. On the contrary, from some 
perspectives this period was where postmodernism appeared to come into its own — to 
become mainstream. It almost seemed as though what postmodernism had been 
anticipating and preparing for all along became the state of things in the nineties, 
especially in relation to new technologies. Here the year 1989 appears to mark certain 
kinds of acceleration rather than decisive endings. In 1989 the first of twenty-four 
satellites that would eventually form the Global Positioning System was placed in orbit; 
also in 1989 the 486 series of microprocessor was launched by the Microsoft 
Corporation. Along with spreadsheet, word processor, database and presentation 
software, this innovation took personal computing out of SF and seriously into the 
homeliness of everyday commodification. In Japan Nintendo made the first Game Boy 
machine in 1989 — the sales figures for Game Boy, combined with those of its successor 
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Game Boy Color, amounted to nothing short of 118.69 million units,  the new platform 
supporting one of the most recognizable avatars of the 80s and 90s — Mario. In the same 
year, and perhaps even more suggestively, Tim Berners-Lee made the first successful 
communication between a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) client via the Internet.    
Access to computer technology and networked connectivity, still severely limited 
at the end of the eighties, exploded in the nineties with the World-Wide Web in particular 
undergoing a utopian and communitarian phase before succumbing to the frenzy of 
commodification and monetization that was the Dot-Com boom.  The transformative 
effects of the new digital media were so radical and pervasive that by the turn of the 
millennium speculation was rife about the approaching end of the codex book and the 
culture it sustained.  All that was solid seemed to be melting into air (or pixels), with 
cascading cultural side-effects, including the emergence of new media of entertainment, 
new art-forms, and (arguably) new models of “cyborg” or “posthuman” subjectivity 
which in turn produced new “writing” —  the subject of Dave Ciccoricco’s chapter in this 
volume, “Digital Culture and Posthumanism.” 
The sense of acceleration characterizing the period between the end of the Cold 
War and the onset of the War on Terror, found clear expression in the cultural production 
of the nineties interregnum — and not only in relation to technology. The nineties were 
the years of multiculturalism’s flowering, amplified and diversified by the arrival of new 
waves of immigration from the global South and East, but those same years were also 
characterized by the backlash against multiculturalism in the so-called “culture wars.”  
Ellen G. Friedmann’s contribution to this volume maps these territories, where 
subcultural and paracultural alternatives — grunge, gangsta rap, indie films, New Age 
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spirituality, Internet culture —  proliferated,  each enjoying its brief heyday before being 
swept up into the market economy and becoming “mainstreamed” and made subservient  
to a mainstream cultural optimism. Here “an awareness of borderland identity and of 
fluidity in subject positions” led to the hope of a sense of  “weness, not in the sense of 
unified community but in the sense of acceptance of difference or fluidity between the 
subject positions people occupy in a pluralistic democracy.” 
Riding the wave of economic globalization and new digital technologies, 
postmodernism achieved planetary reach in the nineties.  A sense of solidarity with the 
planetary ecosystem and concern for its preservation had already emerged by the end of 
the sixties, but the succession of environmental disasters over the course of subsequent 
decades (Three Mile Island, 1979; Chernobyl, 1986; Fukushima, 2011) and a growing 
awareness of the threat of long-term climate change heightened the urgency of 
environmentalist and eco-critical discourses by the nineties.  The same technological 
prowess that jeopardized ecosystems also gave environmentalists powerful new tools for 
imagining, representing and communicating their “sense of the planet.”  This planetary 
imagination increasingly found itself at odds with economic globalization and its 
competing vision of the planet as resource and market.  
Also symptomatic of the nineties interregnum were science-fiction thought-
experiments involving a world order without America. American triumphalism was 
hardly the only imaginative response to end of Cold-War bi-polarization; another 
alternative was to try to imagine a world in which American global leadership, rendered 
redundant by the disappearance of its Cold-War adversary, simply disappeared along 
with its opposite number. What, or who, might fill the gap?  
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 Japan, first of all — the subject of the chapter which opens this section.  An 
economic powerhouse at the beginning of the interregnum phase, Japan appeared to 
some observers to be the epicenter of global postmodernism. A world dominated by 
Japan and its allies had already been imagined by Philip K. Dick as early as 1962 in his 
novel of alternative history, The Man in the High Castle, but a preoccupation with the 
future cultural dominance of Japan only comes fully into its own in the cyberpunk fiction 
of the Eighties.  Glimpsed in Ridley Scott’s highly influential science fiction film Blade 
Runner (1982), the model of a “Japanized” future emerges definitively in William 
Gibson’s two trilogies of the Eighties and Nineties. Takayuki Tatsumi’s contribution in 
this volume charts the complex multi-directional dynamics behind cultural transfer and 
exchange as it operated in the real world, one focused across contemporary aesthetics, 
Japanese tradition, new technologies and the rise of a “global visual culture.” 
  Speculation about a “Japan-centric” world cooled after the Japanese real-estate 
bubble burst in 1991 and Japan’s economy lapsed into its Lost Decade. What took its 
place in futuristic fiction was China. Among the most ambitious and provocative of the 
“China-centric” speculative fictions was the British SF novelist David Wingrove’s cycle 
of eight immense novels appearing under the collective title of Chung Kuo (1990-97). 
Wingrove imagines a future planet Earth entirely covered by seven continent-spanning 
megacities, each governed by one of seven ethnically Han co-emperors. Han civilization 
dominates everywhere, having submerged or eradicated all other world civilizations, 
including the European and American cultures. Though traces of paranoid fantasies of 
Asian domination and a certain amount of exoticizing Orientalism linger in Wingrove’s 
fiction, his sympathies are very evenly divided between the Han overlords, who struggle 
584 
 
to maintain order in a world on the verge of chaotic breakdown, and the submerged 
populations, some of whom are beginning to resist the Han world-order. 
Again, in the real world, one of the great transformations of the nineties was the 
reemergence of China on the global stage, not only as an economic and geopolitical 
powerhouse but also as a cultural presence, the subject of Wang Ning’s chapter in this 
volume.  China underwent “postmodernization” only belatedly, during the New Period of 
1978-1989.  An important catalyzing role in this process was played by Fredric Jameson, 
whose lectures in the mid-eighties introduced Chinese academics and intellectuals to the 
concept of postmodernism.  By the later nineties, as Wang Ning shows, the process had 
advanced to the point where China was re-exporting postmodernism to the West, 
especially in the form of visual art, which enjoyed an international vogue. 
A kind of capstone of the decade’s imagination of the interregnum was Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s novel of alternative history, The Years of Rice and Salt (2002). Here 
Robinson imagines an alternative past in which the fourteenth-century pandemic of 
bubonic plague destroyed, not a third of the population of Europe (as it did in real-world 
history), but 90% of it. World history, in this alternative reality, develops without the 
Europeans or the Euro- Americans. Thus, it falls to the Chinese to discover the New 
World; Renaissance science emerges first in the cities of the Silk Road, between the 
Islamic and Chinese cultural spheres; the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution begins 
in South India instead of Great Britain; the Great War of the early twentieth century is 
fought not among the European powers, but between China and Islam; and so on.   
 Robinson’s speculation about a world without Europe reflects the interregnum 
sensibility, but arrives belatedly in 2002. By then, the depolarized world of the post-Cold 
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War interregnum had already been repolarized — to the manifest relief of some, who 
welcomed a return to the Manichaean certainties of a new (or renewed) “clash of 
civilizations,” albeit one differently oriented than the old one. The Years of Rice and Salt 
stands as a monument to the monstrous and sublime experience of alternativity and multi-
directionality of the in-between years, foreclosed by the War on Terror. Does this return 
to business-as-usual in the imagination (and practice) of geopolitics coincide with another 
mutation in postmodernism, or mark its true end??  
A number of chapters in this final section of The Cambridge History of 
Postmodernism — Stephen Burn’s “Second-Generation Postmoderns,”  Christian 
Moraru’s “Postmodernism, Cosmodernism, Planetarism” and Andrew Hoberek’s 
“Epilogue —: 2001, 2008 and After” explicitly grapple with mapping the territory of 
what comes after the postmodern.  By the beginning of the nineties, the very term 
“postmodernism” was becoming debased coinage, applied so indiscriminately that 
serious cultural producers no longer wanted to be associated with it. As Burn explains, a 
younger generation of postmoderns — including William T. Vollmann, David Foster 
Wallace, Jonathan Franzen, Jonathan Lethem, Karen Tei Yamashita and Colson 
Whitehead, theoretically astute and sometimes impatient with their elders’ lingering 
influence — started making their presence felt on the cultural stage, and some observers 
began to speculate about the emergence of a “post-postmodernism” and to pose the 
question, “What was postmodernism?” To some the claim that nineties culture had 
somehow already passed beyond postmodernism to some kind of “post-postmodernism” 
seemed problematic. Impatience with postmodernism, and eagerness to get “beyond” it, 
pervasive in the early nineties, was not the same thing as actually breaking through to the 
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“post-post,” as the novelist David Foster Wallace’s career seemed poignantly to 
demonstrate. Indeed, some mounted the argument that the very resistance to 
postmodernism in the nineties could be seen as one of the late forms that postmodernism 
itself takes.
3
  Burns himself, however, takes a more nuanced line, noting that “the 
generational divide at issue is not the clean split implied by some explanatory labels, nor 
the fluid continuum implied by others.”  
Andrew Hoberek writes directly about 11/11, recognizing that for many it 
registered as a decisive break, marking among other things “the end of the twentieth 
century.” At the same he doubts that this event in “world history maps easily onto the 
history of literary and cultural production, and in particular onto the emergence of what 
observers increasingly describe as post-postmodernism.” Moraru would go further in the 
direction of imagined continuities, arguing forcefully for an assimilation of 
postmodernism and globalization — the “dissonant landscape of accelerated 
globalization”, he claims, gave postmodernism “a chance to globalize itself.” Here 
Moraru sees the “cosmodern imaginary” as the extension of the ethical and relational 
impetus in much recent philosophy, theory and imaginative literature across cultures, 
globally.  Cosmodernism, as the “cultural logic of late globalization,” comprises in 
Moroaru’s controversial account all the forms of dialogue and interaction among cultures, 
all the varieties of call-and-response, that the hyper networked condition of the turn of 
the millennium makes possible.  
In these ways all three chapters attempt the task of reconstructing forward, as it 
were, from the 90s, but they inevitably look backward too, toward an interregnum which 
defines the contemporaneities of a new millennium. From this double perspective, does 
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1989-2001 constitute a break, signalling the onset of a new period — perhaps the long-
awaited post-postmodernism, its hour come round at last — or does it constitute a period 
in itself? The answer of course is both and neither.   
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